10.Charge Conference
256 linesMS. CAPPLEMAN: Mr. Evans is going to come down, Judge. But I'll stand in until he arrives.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. And do you-all -- Ms. Dugan, do we have the same technology that we have out in Gadsden where we can make changes to them right here?
MS. DUGAN: Yes, sir. I can make changes as we go.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. Can we do that? All right.
MS. KAWASS: Good morning -- good after -- well, good evening, Your Honor.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. Good afternoon. Late afternoon.
MS. KAWASS: Late afternoon.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. And so, Ms. Kawass, you're handling the jury instructions?
MS. KAWASS: Yes, Your Honor.
MS. DUGAN: If I could have just a moment to pull them up?
JUDGE WHEELER: All right.
MS. KAWASS: And, Your Honor, I just wanted to let you know, it's very minor changes. A lot of it really just includes taking out some instructions that the State included.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay.
MS. KAWASS: And I'm a stickler for mirroring the language from the Florida Supreme Court's language --
JUDGE WHEELER: I appreciate that.
MS. KAWASS: So it's just relatively minor changes.
JUDGE WHEELER: What I'm going to do, since the State submitted them to me, I'm going to take it as if they don't have any objection to them. And so I'll be going primarily to you to see as we work our way through --
MS. KAWASS: Right, Your Honor. And I have the copy that they provided to you and I've been going off of their copy and the minor changes that I was talking about.
JUDGE WHEELER: we'll let Ms. Dugan bring them up and then she can just make the changes there. And then we can get the appropriate copies made for tomorrow.
MS. DUGAN: I'm ready.
JUDGE WHEELER: You're ready?
MS. DUGAN: Yes, sir.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. The only thing that I see on the first page is just a minor change, but there's no space above justifiable homicide on my copy. If you could just make sure that's a space there. All right?
MS. DUGAN: Yes, sir.
JUDGE WHEELER: And then, also on the bottom, it's the wrong -- I don't know what those are called on the bottom there. But can you see underneath the page number, it has Mr. Garcia still on there, so we need to take that out for the page number.
MS. DUGAN: Thank you.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. So for the statement of charge, introduction to homicide and the justifiable homicide instruction and the excusable homicide instruction, those are standard instructions. Any discussion on those?
MS. KAWASS: Yes, Your Honor. Just like I said, I'ma stickler with the Florida Supreme Court's guidance, so in the statement of the charge, I would just add that conspiracy to commit murder and solicitation to commit murder. Just the addition of those words instead of it just --
JUDGE WHEELER: Conspiracy to commit murder and solicitation to commit murder?
MS. KAWASS: Right.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. I'm in favor of that. That will just make that more specific.
MS. KAWASS: Just more clarification for the jury.
MS. DUGAN: Conspiracy to commit and solicitation to commit.
MS. KAWASS: Right. To commit murder.
JUDGE WHEELER: Conspiracy to commit murder and solicitation to commit murder.
MS. KAWASS: That's just how it's charged in the information. Just to add those words.
MS. DUGAN: Got it.
JUDGE WHEELER: I just want to make sure that our camera here is not getting any work product by looking at the back of these.
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, as for the introduction to homicide, we would ask that the first three paragraphs be -- we are -- the defense is waiving all lesser includeds in this case. we believe that, based on the facts, we've never disputed that a first-degree murder has been committed. So we would be waiving all Category 1 lessers. We would ask that second-degree murder not be included, manslaughter not be included. Any lessers of murder. We're not disputing that Dan Markel was premeditatedly murdered.
MR. EVANS: State is not waiving the lessers, Your Honor.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. we're keeping the lessers. That's a standard instruction. So we're keeping in both the second degree and the manslaughter.
MS. KAWASS: Okay. Your Honor, we would -- we're not asserting justifiable homicide or excusable homicide. We would ask that those be taken out.
MR. EVANS: I think those are required to be read, Your Honor, and so we are requesting them.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. I'm going to keep them both. It's a standard instruction that's given in every first-degree murder case and so they will remain.
All right. So now we go to Count 1, first-degree murder. And any discussion on that, Ms. Kawass?
MS. KAWASS: No, Your Honor, I have no objection to the actual -- where it says, Count 1, first-degree murder, I have no objection to -- it's the standard jury instruction.
JUDGE WHEELER: And then the standard instruction with the lesser-included crimes, I understand that you have your objections to including them, but that's the standard instruction if we are.
MS. KAWASS: Right.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. And then second-degree murder, any discussion on that?
MS. KAWASS: No, Your Honor.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. And any discussion on the manslaughter?
MS. KAWASS: No, Your Honor.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. Thank you.
Okay. The principals instruction. Any discussion on the principals instruction?
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, I know that it was probably just put in there to facilitate everything for the jury. But the way it starts with, There are two ways in which a person may be a principal, is not in the standard jury instruction. We would just ask that it read principals and then that language is taken out. And it start with, If the defendant helps another person, which is the standard language.
I do note that it says, If the defendant helps another person or persons commit a crime, it says, That defendant. I don't know if that's maybe just because Ms. Magbanua was tried with Mr. Garcia the last time. The standard language says, The defendant, not that defendant. I know I'm being particular, but I'm just, like I said, Your Honor --
JUDGE WHEELER: No. Whenever it's clear, I don't have any problem.
MS. KAWASS: Right. So and then the first -- the rest of the paragraph is fine. And then it said the first -- No. 1, it says, That defendant. I would just ask that it be changed to the defendant. And the same for paragraph two. So instead of that defendant, it says, The defendant.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right.
MS. KAWASS: The language, otherwise, is standard.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. All right. So there are two ways in which the person may be a principal is not in the standard instruction?
MS. KAWASS: No, Your Honor. Because the standards are differentiated between 3. -- I think it's 8 for principal.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay.
MS. KAWASS: The second one would be principal. And then it says, when active participant hired by defendant. That would be the second principal instruction.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. Mr. Evans.
MR. EVANS: Your Honor, the reason it was being requested for both -- this line was inserted the last time, and it needs to be inserted this time, is because there's two ways to prove principals. One is the first paragraph -- or the first one goes through if the defendant helped another person. And goes through one and two.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. I think it's repetitive. I don't think we need it. I mean, if you read it all in its entirety, you can tell that's what the jury instruction says, that there's two ways. So we're going to take that out, Ms. Dugan.
MS. DUGAN: Yes, sir.
JUDGE WHEELER: And then if you could change "that" on that first line to "the". And then, also, with one and two, change "that" to "the". If you have any question about what I'm saying, then let me know.
MS. DUGAN: TI don't.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. And then on the next way to be a principal where it's one, two, three. On the first -- on No. 1 we'll need to change that to “the".
MS. KAWASS: The. And, also, I believe in the initial paragraph. I have it here as an addition, I think. It might have been inadvertently left out. It just says defendant instead of the defendant.
And, Your Honor, I'd just like to note for the record that the first line of that paragraph where it says, The defendant may also be a principal if he or she, is not standard language. It just starts -- the standard language starts with, If the defendant paid or promised to pay another person, that's how the standard reads.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right.
MR. EVANS: The “may” was instructed for the same reason the first line was instructed, to differentiate there's two ways to prove principal, which is the first part, which would be 3.5(a), I believe.
MS. KAWASS: It's just a and b.
MR. EVANS: Yeah. 3.5(a). And the second part is the second way you can prove the person is a principal is 3.5Cb), which is where it starts, Defendant paid or promised, is what it says. But the reason that line -- the first part of that line was inserted, it was inserted last time, was to --
JUDGE WHEELER: I don't care if it was inserted last time. I don't need to hear that. Is it in the standard instruction?
MR. EVANS: It is not in the standard instruction.
JUDGE WHEELER: Then I don't want it. I don't want it. The defendant may also be a principal is struck. And so it will start with "if".
MS. KAWASS: If the defendant. Right. And, Your Honor, I'd just like to not in element one it says, that defendant, again, instead of "the".
MR. EVANS: And, Your Honor, for the record, the reason the State has made this and is requesting is an obstruction and objecting to the removal of it, it needs to be clear to the jury that there are two ways to prove the defendant may be a principal. One is under 5(a) -- or 3.5(€a). The other is under 3.5(b).
And the way it's being worded now does not make it clear to the jury that distinction, that there are two different ways.
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, if I may respond. I believe that how that could be clarified is where you have principals, which is how the 3.5(a) is titled, Principals. 3.5(Cb) is actually titled Principals when active participant hired by a defendant. I would ask that that title be included before the second one so that the jury is well aware that there are two different ways that principals can be proved.
MR. EVANS: Would not have any objection to that, Your honor. Because then it clearly makes the distinction there are two ways.
MS. KAWASS: I agree with the State, Your Honor.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. Well, make that change then.
MS. DUGAN: Say that one more time. I'm sorry.
MS. KAWASS: So, Sarah, it would look like this.
MS. DUGAN: All right.
MS. KAWASS: So it would just be the title of the actual 3.5(b). So take out this language here that says, The defendant may also -- right. And then -- so what will be capital and you can add in this title, which says, principals, dash, when active participant. Because I understand that the State wants to differentiate the two. So it would be that title but with a hyphen right before the second one.
I don't know if you want to include in the standard -- I know it's repetitive, but after both principals it says, To be a principal the defendant does not have to be present --
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. Hold on a second. we need to get this on the record.
MS. KAWASS: Okay. Your Honor, if the Court agreed that we should have them differentiated by title, under the first principals instruction, the standard language, and it's repetitive to both principals, but I want to make sure that it's clear to the jury for both.
After the second element on the first principals, there should be language that reads, To be a principal the defendant does not have to be present when the crime is committed. That language is read for both principals instructions. So it will be repetitive, but since we're delineating them into two different types of principals, I'm sure the State would agree that that line needs to be read more than once.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. Mr. Evans, is that a good enough distinction for the State?
MR. EVANS: Yes. Since we're breaking the two of them out, they should read and put them under different headers.
MS. KAWASS: Right.
MR. EVANS: They should read as the standard instructions read. It does include that line, so we have no objection to it reading. It's a standard read.
JUDGE WHEELER: Thank you.
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, in paragraph 2 under 3.5(b), which is when active participant. I would request that they cross out “he or". Because it reads he or she, but in this case it's just Ms. Magbanua.
MR. EVANS: That's acceptable, Your Honor.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. Yeah, in both paragraphs it should say "she".
(Discussion off the record.)
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, in the 3.5(b), the active participant. In the State's version, it's broken them into two separate sentences. It's actually just once sentence. So it says, If the defendant paid or promised to pay another person or persons to commit a crime, comma, the defendant is a principal and must be treated. They have it as two separate sentences. So I would just ask, if the State has no objection --
MR. EVANS: No objection.
MS. KAWASS: Just to have it read as one fluid sentence.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. So it would be comma and then a lower case.
MS. KAWASS: It would be comma, the defendant. And all the language is the same after that.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. The change has been made?
MS. KAWASS: Yes.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. All right. So now we're to independent act.
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, we were asking to remove that instruction. I did some case law and I found case law that says that when the defendant's theory at trial is supported by the testimony at trial from the defendant is that they're denying any involvement, it negates the propriety of an independent act instruction. And I can put the case cite on the record.
JUDGE WHEELER: Mr. Evans, any objection?
MR. EVANS: No objection. If it was put in there last time at one of the defendant's requests.
MS. KAWASS: I think it was Mr. Garcia's request.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. So we'll take out independent act.
MS. KAWASS: Yes.
JUDGE WHEELER: Count 2, for conspiracy, any discussion?
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, the only language that's not standard is the first line that says, In Count 2, Katherine B. Magbanua, the defendant in this case, has been accused of the crime of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. That's the only language that's not standard. I mean, I don't --
JUDGE WHEELER: That's just an introductory line. we'll keep that in.
MS. KAWASS: Right.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. So everything else is standard. You're okay with it?
MS. KAWASS: Yes.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. Ms. Dugan, you're all caught up?
MS. KAWASS: No changes.
MS. DUGAN: No changes. Okay. Yes, I am caught up.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. All right. Count 3, solicitation, it has the same introductory line.
MS. KAWASS: Right.
JUDGE WHEELER: And then any other discussion?
MS. KAWASS: Yes, Your Honor. The amended information for the solicitation count actually lists who the one or more persons were. So I would ask that it track the language of the information. So we would take out, The defendant solicited one or more persons. And put in, The defendant solicited Luis Rivera and/or Sigfredo Garcia, because that's how it's charged in the information.
JUDGE WHEELER: Do you have any objection or do you have discussion on that, Mr. Evans.
MR. EVANS: Let me have a discussion with --
JUDGE WHEELER: You want the specific names of --
MR. EVANS: Yes, that would be acceptable, Your Honor.
MS. KAWASS: And that's exactly how it's worded in the information, Your Honor.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. So, the defendant solicited --
MS. KAWASS: Luis Rivera and/or Sigfredo Garcia.
JUDGE WHEELER: ATI right.
MS. KAWASS: That's how it's charged in the information. And that would also go for the second element.
JUDGE WHEELER: Luis Rivera and/or.
MS. KAWASS: Yes, and/or. I hate that language in jury instructions, but that's how it's charged.
JUDGE WHEELER: Sigfredo Garcia.
MS. KAWASS: Right. And that would also go for element two, Your Honor. Instead of one or more persons it would say Luis Rivera.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. You see that, Ms. Dugan?
MS. DUGAN: Yeah.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. Let me know when you're ready.
MS. DUGAN: Got it.
JUDGE WHEELER: Plea of not guilty, reasonable doubt and burden of proof is the standard instruction. Any discussion on that?
MS. KAWASS: Like I said, I don't mean to be a stickler. I just like to track the language. It says, To overcome the defendant's presumption of innocence, the State has the burden of proving. The standard instruction doesn't pluralize crimes, it just says crime, with which the defendant is charged was committed, and the defendant is the person who committed the crime. It's just -- it's mere semantics, Your honor. I mean, I doubt whether it says crimes, or was, or were, or individual or person really have an effect on the jurors. I'm just a very big stickler for tracking language for the instructions.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. So do you want that in plural then, since there's three crimes charged?
MR. EVANS: That was the reason it was included, Your Honor --
JUDGE WHEELER: All right.
MR. EVANS: -- was because there was three crimes charged.
JUDGE WHEELER: And the defendant is the individual who -- so then it needs to be consistent with the last crime on that paragraph. Has the burden of proving the crimes with which the defendant is charged were committed, and the defendant is the individual who committed the crimes.
MS. KAWASS: Right.
MS. DUGAN: Got it.
JUDGE WHEELER: Got it. All right. Then we go to weighing the evidence.
MS. KAWASS: Judge, everything is exactly as worded. I would just ask that the tenth factor be considered, which was, Does the witness have a general reputation for dishonesty. And I would be pointing to Mr. Rivera.
MR. EVANS: TI don't know if reputation evidence was admitted in this case.
MS. KAWASS: well, Garcia and Rivera. Several witnesses, Your Honor, were asked about Mr. Rivera's reputation. was he known as a Latin King member, which I would -- wendi as well.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. Out of an abundance of caution, we'll put that back in.
MS. KAWASS: And Ms. Adelson, of course.
JUDGE WHEELER: Do you know that language, Ms. Dugan?
MS. DUGAN: I can look it up.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. So let's see, we keep -- all right. So we're adding No. 10.
MS. KAWASS: And the rest of that instruction is perfectly fine.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. We keep in law enforcement. we keep in expert witness.
MS. KAWASS: One through ten. The nine that they included were properly included.
JUDGE WHEELER: ATl right. I'm moving down from that. So burden of proof instruction, law enforcement instruction, expert witness instruction. we keep in the paragraph in regards to immunity. So now we're --
Ms. Dugan, are you caught up?
MS. DUGAN: Got it.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. Now, we will keep in, The defendant has become a witness.
MS. KAWASS: Right.
JUDGE WHEELER: So we can take off the shading off of that. And keep in the next two paragraphs and then take out, defendant not testifying.
MS. DUGAN: Got it.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. Defendant statements.
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, we would ask that that be removed. From the research I've done, it seems the language of the instruction talks about whether a statement was made knowingly, voluntarily, and freely made. It seems to deal with statements of the defendants that were made to police. Like a confession, anything of that sort. And there's no evidence that Ms. Magbanua has given a formal statement to the police.
JUDGE WHEELER: Any discussion from the State?
MR. EVANS: We don't have any objection to taking that out. It's just usually a standard one any time any comment --
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. we'll take out defendant statements then. Rules for deliberation. we keep in all of those except for No. 7.
MS. KAWASS: Seven. Yes, that's what I was going to say. TI don't believe that that was applicable in this case.
JUDGE WHEELER: Let me know when you're ready.
MS. DUGAN: Ready.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. And then so we'll have renumbered to just seven of those.
Cautionary instruction and single defendant, multiple counts.
MS. KAWASS: No objection, Your Honor.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. Thank you.
I'll need a verdict form. So have you -- did you send that to me? I didn't get one.
MR. EVANS: No, sir, we haven't sent a verdict form down yet.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. If you can send me one in morning, then we'll go over that in the morning.
And then submitting the case to the jury.
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, of course I just have to lay the record. For the verdict instruction, I would, of course, object to the inclusion of any language that deals with lesser includeds based on my prior objection. But based on Your Honor's ruling, we have to keep it jin.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. And you can put that on the record when I show you the verdict form also.
MS. KAWASS: Okay.
JUDGE WHEELER: So submitting the case to jury. Anything in regards to that?
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, there was one line that was left out from the standard, which is in the second paragraph. which would be the second sentence after, are present in the jury room. The language that was left out was, If a juror goes to the restroom, the deliberations should stop until the juror returns. That's the only discrepancy I saw with the standard.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. what number is that instruction. Do you know?
MS. KAWASS: Might be 3.--
JUDGE WHEELER: Submitting case to the jury instruction?
MS. KAWASS: 13.
MR. EVANS: 3.13.
JUDGE WHEELER: Yeah, so there's one sentence.
MR. EVANS: So it's which line?
MS. KAWASS: The second paragraph, the second sentence. It says something about the restroom. If a juror goes to the restroom, the deliberations should stop until the juror returns.
JUDGE WHEELER: If a juror goes to the restroom, comma, deliberations should stop until the juror returns.
MS. KAWASS: That's the only line that I saw that was not present.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. we'll include that.
MS. DUGAN: Got it.
JUDGE WHEELER: Got it?
MS. DUGAN: Got it.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. I think that we're set then.
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, just one more thing. The last paragraph items it says, Items were received into evidence. You may examine whatever exhibits you think will help in your deliberations. The standard language gives two options, either, A, These exhibits will be sent into the jury room with you when you begin to deliberate, or, If you wish to see any exhibits, please request that in writing.
I didn't see any language that said, The exhibits will be delivered to you shortly. So I'm not sure if Your Honor wants to select A or B. we're fine with whichever one the Court would prefer to keep in.
JUDGE WHEELER: The exhibits will be delivered to you -- all right. So the exhibits will be sent into the jury room with you when you begin to deliberate is appropriate.
MS. KAWASS: I left that up to Your Honor's -- I didn't know if you'd want them to request it before they see, or if you would just send everything back. Either one would be fine with the defense.
JUDGE WHEELER: Well, they have the capability to view video and audio back in the jury room, in this jury room, I believe. I checked on that.
MS. DUGAN: What about this special equipment, though? If they want to hear Dolce Vita or the wire tap calls, they might have to come back in here.
Maybe none of us could be in here and they could just come --
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, I wouldn't object if you wanted to add an extra -- especially for the Dolce vita video. So you'd say, If you wish to see. I mean, that particular exhibit, because I really don't know how they would get the special equipment.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. We can -- let's take out, The exhibits will be delivered to you shortly.
MS. KAWASS: Right.
JUDGE WHEELER: we'll put in, These exhibits will be sent into the jury room with you when you begin to deliberate. And then we're going to add another sentence. And let me know when you're ready with that.
MS. DUGAN: Got it.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. If you wish to use the audio headphones provided in the courtroom, comma, please request that in writing.
MS. DUGAN: Okay.
JUDGE WHEELER: Any objection from the defense?
MS. KAWASS: No objection, Your Honor.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right.
MS. DUGAN: And I'm trying to fix the footer. She has two case numbers. So there's two case numbers --
JUDGE WHEELER: Oh, the case numbers are 2000 --
MS. DUGAN: Are we putting both of them in the footer. Because right now --
JUDGE WHEELER: I've been using both of them.
MS. DUGAN: Okay.
JUDGE WHEELER: Because for some reason that's what the clerk's office has. It's 2016CF3036 and 2018cCF497.
MS. DUGAN: Okay.
MS. KAWASS: And, Your Honor, I'd just like to say I had all the intentions of removing the lessers, so I'm going to be honest with the Court, I didn't really look through --
JUDGE WHEELER: Of reviewing what?
MS. KAWASS: The lesser includeds. Because we all had been asking. So I'm going to go and look through them tonight. I'm sure they're standard. But if I do see anything that I would be happy to contact the State. And just to let Your Honor know. But I'm sure they're standard instructions.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. And you can have discussions and then just let me know in the morning.
MS. KAWASS: Yeah.
JUDGE WHEELER: And -- but we'll go with this as the final form unless you have any discussion to change that.
MS. KAWASS: Right.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. And then so, Ms. Dugan, you have that. If you could, when you get back to your office, ask somebody to print that out and can you make the copies?
MS. DUGAN: Yes, sir.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. we'll make 25.
MS. DUGAN: Yes, sir.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. Are we all set?
MS. DUGAN: Yes, sir.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay.
MS. DUGAN: I'm going to e-mail these to everybody, if that's okay. Just in case there's anything else.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. They're coming as an e-mail to everyone.
All right. we're all set then with the charge conference. And so tomorrow morning we'll meet back here. we're starting promptly at 8:45. we'll have the jury instructions ready to go. Read the jury instructions, we'll go right into closing.
All right. For the State, Ms. Dugan, who's doing closing for you, Ms. Cappleman?
MS. DUGAN: Yes, sir.
JUDGE WHEELER: She's not here?
MS. DUGAN: No, sir. But I can --
JUDGE WHEELER: And what about for the defense?
MS. KAWASS: I am judge.
JUDGE WHEELER: Ms. Kawass. All right. So I want to get them into the jury room by lunchtime. So are we going to -- these jury instructions aren't going to take that long to read, so we're going to be starting at approximately 9:00 o'clock.
All right. So do you think 90 minutes is sufficient for you, Ms. Kawass?
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, I think so. 90 minutes and 90 minutes. Yeah.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. So I'm going to hold you to that. Okay. And so if Ms. Cappleman can get the same message.
MS. DUGAN: That will be fine.
JUDGE WHEELER: And then, as I stated to the jury, then I'll excuse the alternates, we'll send them back to start deliberating at that time. And I'm going to provide them lunch and then I'm going to tell them, now the time is in your hands, in regards to that. Okay.
MR. EVANS: Just to be clear, Your Honor, the 90 minutes, she can divide up however she chooses?
JUDGE WHEELER: She can, however she chooses.
Okay. All right. Anything else before we break for the evening? From the defense?
MS. KAWASS: Not from the defense, Judge.
JUDGE WHEELER: Okay. From the State?
MS. DUGAN: No, sir.
JUDGE WHEELER: All right. Thank you. All right. we're in recess until tomorrow.
(Court adjourned for the day.)