Garcia Verdict and Magbanua Mistrial
162 linesJUDGE HANKINSON: Report from the bailiffs is we had an uneventful evening withe the jurors and they actually begin deliberating this morning at about eight o'clock.
JUDGE HANKINSON: We have a question. I believe everyone has been given a copy of the question.
MR. ZANGENEH: Yes, sir.
JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. For the record, the question is: can you be a principal to premeditation if you do not premeditate it yourself?
JUDGE HANKINSON: I've written a proposed answer. Hear y'all's comments.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Dear jurors, again, you're asking me to apply the facts to the law. On pages two and three, I have defined first-degree premeditated murder. On pages five and six, I have defined principals. If you're confused by those definitions, please let me help clear up your confusion. However, I cannot answer hypothetical questions. I can only answer legal questions.
MR. ZANGENEH: That's what it appears pragmatically that the jurors are asking: can you be a principal to premeditation if you do not premeditate it yourself? The meaning of it appears to be the exact position of an independent act — that this person in their hypothetical did an independent act.
JUDGE HANKINSON: If you want me to mention independent act — that's — I don't have a problem. I'm not sure that the question is that clear, that that's what they're asking, but that's one of the instructions; I don't have any problem referring to it also. Ms. Magbanua's position would be that the response should be that the jury needs to rely on the law that is presented to them in the instructions, and that's it. That's what I've done, in a little bit of a long-winded way. I think we need to at least be acknowledging that we're trying to answer their questions.
JUDGE HANKINSON: In essence, that's what you're saying, but I don't think I've done anything else other than refer them back to the jury instructions. But I do think — it's the second time — I think it is important that I tell them that I cannot answer hypotheticals. I think that needs to be done, because this is kind of just a veiled hypothetical. I think we need to get it across that I cannot answer that. Give me a minute — other than any specific objection to what I've said. State, have a problem with an independent act. also?
MR. EVANS: We request that it not be. They're not talking about independent act. They're talking about per-mediatation. Pretty clear they're have issues with that portion.
JUDGE HANKINSON: I'll refer them back to the jury instructions. Give me a minute.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Dear jurors, again you are asking me to apply the facts to the law. On pages two and three, I have defined first-degree premeditated murder; on pages five and six, I have defined principals; on pages six and seven, I have defined independent act.
JUDGE HANKINSON: If you are confused by those definitions, please let me help clear up your confusion.
JUDGE HANKINSON: However, I cannot answer hypothetical questions.
JUDGE HANKINSON: I can only answer legal questions.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Any additional objection to that explanation?
MR. ZANGENEH: No, sir. No objection.
JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. I'll give that to the jury.
JUDGE HANKINSON: We'll be in recess until we hear further.
BAILIFF: All rise. Court is back in session.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Everybody has a copy of it?
JUDGE HANKINSON: According to the law are there an exceptions/exemptions to an individual being a principal to a criminal act. Reference instructions page five. Principles. Paragraph one. That the criminal act be done i.e. principal to any act.
JUDGE HANKINSON: I'm not real sure how to respond to the question. I'll hear from ya'll on what you propose. State?
MR. EVANS: For the first part, I don't believe there are any exceptions or exemptions. If there aren't any exemptions or exceptions in the balance of approved, and two, as the second part, and after the read sort of this two-part question, it seems like they're getting caught up on this as they put the quote, they commit a crime. And then the other part is that the crime that should be that the criminal act be done and i.e. principle to any act. I think in this situation the we probably just need to change that language from commit a crime to commit first degree murder, second degree murder for manslaughter and then the second part that the criminal act be done and that would be the first degree murder, second degree murder, third degree murder to be done.
MR. EVANS: So I think there's a two-part answer to the question. And I think it should also only be done on page five where they're talking about the first way to commit a principle, but it also ought to be explained to them as well in the second part of page 6, where the alternative version of showing how the principle may be.
MR. ZANGENEH: I think it's pretty clear that they're hung up here based on this question and the other questions that follow. They're questioning whether or not a crime has to be the crime. Okay? So I think the instruction has to be that they're the same thing.
MR. ZANGENEH: Committing a crime with the intent that the crime be done — I think that's, but I think that's the intention of what my reading of this question — the questions that preceded it — that's what they wanted to do, given the fact that this question is in line with the other questions.
MR. ZANGENEH: And if it's a robbery and then a homicide takes place, it falls in unison with this question. So I think the answer should be that principal applies to the charged crimes only. This is not a felony murder case. And that "a crime" and "the crime" have to be to the same.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Magbanua.
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, I agree with Mr. Zangeneh.
MS. KAWASS: For example, Judge, manslaughter is not a specific intent crime. It cannot be a principal to manslaughter. So then now it gets confusing.
MS. KAWASS: It's our position it should be the crime charged.
MR. ZANGENEH: Whenever the court's ready, I just want to add one thing whenever we have time.
MR. ZANGENEH: With regard to what the government requested — that they include the second definition under the principal instructions — they didn't comment on that. I wouldn't bring that to their attention, because they have it in front of them and that's not one of the questions. I think we also need to say specifically: principal to any act? We need to be very clear that that's the answer. No, they are not the principal to any act. It has to be a principal to the charged crimes, the charged allegations.
JUDGE HANKINSON: My problem is where kind of guessing what they're asking. I don't really want to be guessing what they're asking us.
JUDGE HANKINSON: I would propose on this. I have given you the full definition of principles. There are no exceptions, exemptions to an individual being a principle to a criminal act. I am not clear about the rest of your question. Please clarify your question for me.
MR. ZANGENEH: When they ask "commit a crime" and they underline the word "a," and then they ask "the criminal act be done." I think what they're asking is, if one and then another crime happened, are you a principal? Because you have to have the conscious intent coming. But I will defer to the court. But that's Mr. Garcia's position.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Magbanua.
MS. KAWASS: Based on that last sentence on the question, I believe they're wondering if the principle can be applied to any criminal act which is not the state of the law. You have to have knowledge that that crime is going to be committed. And that needs to be clear to them. Anything else would be a mistatemnt of the law.
MS. KAWASS: Cause they are not charged with felony murder. So.
JUDGE HANKINSON: We're kind of guessing what they're asking. I don't see where it hurts anything to ask them to clarify their question.
MR. ZANGENEH: That's fine.
MS. KAWASS: That's fine.
JUDGE HANKINSON: No problem. I'll go ahead and give them this answer while we're working on the next question. The next question — we'll go ahead and work on that. I'm going to deliver this to the jury, so Next inquiry from the jury: number one, if we have a hung jury on one person, can we give a verdict on another? And number two, if we have a hung jury on a count, can we give a verdict on another count on the same individual?
JUDGE HANKINSON: I think the answer to one is pretty clearly yes. I don't know that it requires any elaboration. Does anybody believe that requires any elaboration?
MR. EVANS: No, sir.
MR. ZANGENEH: No, Your Honor.
JUDGE HANKINSON: I've got to read this second one.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Number two: there are three charges. If they've decided one or two but not the other, can they render on a single count? And then again, I think the answer is yes. Anybody feel like we need elaborate further on that?
MR. EVANS: No, sir.
MR. ZANGENEH: No, Your Honor.
MR. DECOSTE: One brief second, Your Honor.
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, we would also ask if you could direct their attention to the instruction on page 13 — multiple counts, multiple defendants, and verdict.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Okay, but I think the direct answer would be: one, yes; two, yes.
JUDGE HANKINSON: I will remind you of the instruction on multiple counts, multiple defendants on page 13.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Does that read, everyone?
MR. ZANGENEH: That's fine with me, Judge.
MS. KAWASS: I'm sorry — yes. Yes.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Okay. I mean, let me write it and I'll read it back to you.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Dear jurors, number one, yes. Number two, yes.
JUDGE HANKINSON: And then I continue, I refer you back to the instruction on page 13 as to multiple counts, multiple defendants, for your consideration of these questions. Anybody have a problem with that?
MR. EVANS: No, Your Honor.
MR. ZANGENEH: No, Judge.
MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, I'm having reservations as to the response to number two, just because — because I think it applies differently to Ms. Magbanua, because the case that was presented against Ms. Magbanua, I would have to be assuming — I don't know who they're talking about in question two, but the act that forms the principal is the conspiracy and the solicitation. So it almost seems like if it were to Ms. Magbanua it's going inconsistent verdicts if it's not guilty or if it's hung on one and not the other. If I'm making sense.
JUDGE HANKINSON: I don't agree. I'll overrule that objection. We'll be in recess.
JUDGE HANKINSON: I have a note from the jury. I assume everybody has a copy of the note.
MR. EVANS: Yes, sir.
MR. ZANGENEH: Yes, Judge.
MS. KAWASS: Yes, Your Honor.
JUDGE HANKINSON: For the record, it says the jury has reached a verdict on one defendant, all counts, and is hung on the second defendant on all counts.
JUDGE HANKINSON: I'll hear from you all how you wish to proceed. What's the State's position?
MR. EVANS: We'd be requesting an Allen charge on the second count. I guess there's some question as to whether or not we take the verdict on the first defendant and then give them the Allen charge and send them back on the second defendant.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Well, what do you suggest?
MR. EVANS: We take the verdict on the first defendant and give them the Allen charge and send them back on the second defendant.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Garcia?
MR. ZANGENEH: I agree.
MS. KAWASS: Yes, Your Honor, I agree, because we would be requesting the Allen charge if they're hung on the second one.
JUDGE HANKINSON: We'll find out, I guess, anyway.
JUDGE HANKINSON: So everybody's in agreement. I will take the verdict on whichever defendant it is that they have decided. I will excuse that defendant, and the attorneys stay if you want, but there's no reason to. And then I will give them an Allen charge as to the second.
MR. ZANGENEH: With regards to, if the defendant that's hung is Mr. Garcia, we would not be requesting Allen charge, just for the record.
JUDGE HANKINSON: I tell you what — I'm going to change my mind about the one leaving, because it depends if it's Mr. Garcia that's been convicted. We still need to talk about, you know, how we're going to proceed next. So anyway, I think they are shackled at this point in time. They'll just — there is a — if they'll just remain seated when the jury comes in. I'm sorry, let me respond to that. I'm going to decide not now — I'm not going to wait and see who's who as to what I'm going to do. Both — both ways. If they're at this point hung on one, whichever one it is, I'm going to give an Allen charge, and I'm going to accept the verdict on the other one.
MR. ZANGENEH: Yes, Judge.
JUDGE HANKINSON: All right.
JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. Let's have the jury in, please.
BAILIFF: Jury's in the courtroom.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Everybody be seated, please.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Mr. Russell, the notes have been from you, and I see you with the verdict form in your hand. Are you our foreperson?
JUROR: Yes, sir.
JUDGE HANKINSON: It's my understanding that you have reached a verdict as to one of the defendants. Is that correct?
JUROR: Yes, sir.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Would you hand that verdict to the bailiff, please, sir?
JUDGE HANKINSON: There should be no reaction to the verdict from anyone in the audience. If you can't abide by that, please step out.
JUDGE HANKINSON: State of Florida v. Sigfredo Garcia. We, the jury, find as follows as to count one: the defendant is guilty of first-degree murder.
JUDGE HANKINSON: We, the jury, find as follows as to count two: the defendant is guilty of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.
JUDGE HANKINSON: We, the jury, find as follows as to count three: the defendant is not guilty.
JUDGE HANKINSON: So say we all, this 11th day of October 2019.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Mr. Russell, did I accurately reflect the verdict of the jury?
JUROR: Yes, you did, Your Honor.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Do you wish to have the jury polled?
MR. ZANGENEH: Yes, Judge.
JUDGE HANKINSON: All right.
JUDGE HANKINSON: This is a standard procedure. I just need to confirm with each of you that what I've just announced is your individual verdict as well as the verdict of the jury as a whole. We'll do it by number, and we'll start with number one. Is this your verdict as well as the verdict of the jury as a whole as to Mr. Garcia? Number two, juror. Number three, juror. Number four, juror. Number five, juror. Number six, juror. Number seven, juror. Number eight, juror. Number nine, juror. Number ten. Number eleven, juror. Number 12, juror.
JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. The jury has unanimously confirmed the verdict. It will be filed.
JUDGE HANKINSON: As to Ms. Magbanua, whichever is left, I'm going to give you an instruction on law. I would ask that you listen to my instruction as to that.
JUDGE HANKINSON: I know that all of you worked hard to try to find a verdict in this case. It apparently has been impossible for you so far, hard as to Ms. Magbanua.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Sometimes an early vote before discussion can make it hard to reach an agreement about the case later. The vote, not the discussion, might make it hard to see all sides of the case.
JUDGE HANKINSON: We are all aware that it is legally permissible for a jury to disagree.
JUDGE HANKINSON: There are two things a jury can lawfully do: agree on a verdict, or disagree on what the facts of the case may truly be. There is nothing to disagree about on the law. The law is as I told you. If you have any disagreements about the law, I should clear them up for you now — that should be my problem, not yours. If you disagree over what you believe the evidence showed, then only you can resolve that conflict, if it is to be resolved.
JUDGE HANKINSON: I only have one request of you. By law, I cannot demand this of you, but I want you to go back into the jury room, then, taking turns, tell each of the other jurors about any weakness in your position.
JUDGE HANKINSON: You should not interrupt each other or comment on each other's views until each of you has had a chance to talk.
JUDGE HANKINSON: After you have done that, if you simply cannot reach a verdict, then return to the courtroom and I will declare this case mistried and will discharge you with my sincere appreciation for your services. You may now retire to continue with your deliberation.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Everybody be seated, please.
JUDGE HANKINSON: From Magbanua, any objection to the instruction given?
MR. DECOSTE: No, Your Honor.
JUDGE HANKINSON: And from the State?
MS. CAPPLEMAN: No, sir.
JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. Garcia, you were going to give me some information on mitigating circumstances. I called it in to Ms. Wissinger at 11 o'clock this morning. She just hadn't let me know that. We'll double-check on that.
JUDGE HANKINSON: I mean, I don't mean to say I need the e-mails, but anyway, if we don't have it, we'll let you know and work that out.
JUDGE HANKINSON: There are probably some legal issues that we need to discuss before we start. So maybe what I'm thinking is, we start 10 o'clock on Monday, resolve some legal issues, with the understanding we'll start with the jury at one o'clock. That work for y'all?
MS. CAPPLEMAN: Yes, sir.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Mr. Evans?
MR. EVANS: Yes, your honor. I will let the court know — I haven't had time to confirm the times; I gave you some ideas.
MR. EVANS: We'll do the evaluation of Mr. Garcia around 1 o'clock at the jail. Counsel has a right to be present.
JUDGE HANKINSON: 1 o'clock when?
MR. EVANS: Sunday.
JUDGE HANKINSON: I guess you all are here for the duration anyway.
JUDGE HANKINSON: So anyway, any issues on any of that?
JUDGE HANKINSON: That is how we will proceed, unless the juror tells us that 1 o'clock isn't going to work. But it seemed to me we had asked how long it would take. She said about half an hour. I think her appointment is at 11.
JUDGE HANKINSON: So anyway, that should work.
JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. Mr. Garcia has remained in custody pending sentencing in this matter. We'll start sentencing Monday morning at 10 o'clock.
JUDGE HANKINSON: As to Magbanua, we'll wait to hear further from the jury. All right. So Mr. Garcia can be excused. There's no reason to have him.
Video missing of court resumption. Note from jury about not being able to reach a verdict on Magbanua already revealed.
MR. DECOSTE: ...they need to be tended to. I believe they need to be tended to first.
JUDGE HANKINSON: We're going to set a case management in a few weeks and discuss what your status is, but it needs to have at least a holding date. So we'll do a strikeout. Give us one now.
COURT CLERK: October the 22nd. 10:30.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Why don't you give us the next one?
COURT CLERK: Judge, you'll be there. The other one.
JUDGE HANKINSON: What's that?
COURT CLERK: You'll be in Sager 1148.
COURT CLERK: You want to go that far?
JUDGE HANKINSON: Why don't we go to the next one after that?
COURT CLERK: November the Well, I guess there's a...
JUDGE HANKINSON: Let's do October 24th. Is that a Tuesday?
COURT CLERK: Oh, October 22nd. Yes, sir, it is.
JUDGE HANKINSON: We'll set a case management October 22nd at 10:30. Y'all just need to advise us what your status is by then and discuss getting it reset at that point in time. All right?
MR. DECOSTE: Your Honor wants to know our status on the case by then?
JUDGE HANKINSON: Right. If you're going to continue to represent Ms. Magbanua.
MR. DECOSTE: All right. I'm not trying to give an indication that we're not. I know Your Honor knows there's things that need to be addressed before we can announce that.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Okay. All right. Can we have a jury, please?
BAILIFF: Jury's in the courtroom.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Everybody be seated, please.
JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. So, Mr. Russ Meisel, I take from your note that as to Ms. Magbanua, the jury is unable to come to a unanimous decision on any of the three charges.
JUROR: That's correct, Your Honor.
JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. So as to Ms. Magbanua, I will declare this case mistried. As we've discussed, I'll set a case management October 22nd at 10:30. See where we go for that.
JUDGE HANKINSON: You know, I know y'all worked hard. Sometimes it just doesn't work out. That's nothing to be concerned about. As long as everybody in good faith was trying to follow the law, I explained that that's just part of the process that happens.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Normally I would tell you you're done, but unfortunately you're not done. We still need to have another proceeding as to Mr. Garcia. Ms. Evans, it's my understanding you have a doctor's appointment at 11 o'clock Monday. So what we've discussed with the parties is starting at 1 o'clock on Monday. Will that allow you to make your appointment?
JUROR: Yes, sir.
JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. So we're going to reconvene Monday, 1 o'clock. Let's get in here a few minutes before that, if you would, please, so we can get started right at 1 o'clock.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Just give you a little idea where we stand. From talking to the attorneys, they're anticipating about a half day of testimony, so we'll probably finish the testimony on Monday afternoon and make argument and instructions to you on Tuesday morning. So that's kind of where we — you know, things can change, but that's everybody's best understanding at this point in time. So you still need to abide by the court rules and not discuss the case with anyone. It is possible someone would inquire of you — they may think, since Mr. Garcia's decided on the first part, that they can ask you about that. Still, you can't discuss that. And don't discuss your situation as to Ms. Magbanua, even though y'all are done with consideration of that, because the cases are too closely related for you to separate those two things out. Don't watch any media accounts. Don't read the paper.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Anybody have any questions about what's expected of you?
JUDGE HANKINSON: We'll see you Monday at 1 o'clock. I'll let you step out with the bailiffs.
JUDGE HANKINSON: Anything else? Alright. We'll be in recess.