Skip to content
Garcia–MagbanuatranscripttranscriptGarcia Verdict and Magbanua Mistrial - Day 11 - Garcia–MagbanuaThe jury found Sigfredo Garcia guilty of first-degree murder and conspiracy, with an acquittal on Count 3, and each juror confirmed the verdict. The court later declared a mistrial for Katherine Magbanua after her jury could not reach unanimity.
Georgia CapplemanEddie EvansChristopher DeCosteTara KawassSaam ZangenehJames C. HankinsonJudge HankinsonMr. EvansMs. KawassMr. ZangenehBailiffMr. DeCosteJurorMs. CapplemanCourt Clerkjury_instructionsproceduralverdict
Garcia–Magbanua/Day 11/October 11, 2019
1 page·0 witnesses·224 lines
The jury returned guilty verdicts against Sigfredo Garcia on first-degree murder and conspiracy charges, with all 12 jurors confirming the verdict. The court declared a mistrial in Katherine Magbanua's case after the jury reported no unanimous decision on any charge.
Jury Question - Premeditation and Principal Liability
Jury InstructionJury Instr.Jury Question - Premeditation and Principal Liability

PROCEEDINGS

JUDGE HANKINSON: Well, the report from the bailiffs is we had an uneventful evening with the jurors, and they actually began deliberating this morning at about 8 o'clock.

We have a question. I believe everybody was given a copy of the question, were they not?

337:45

MR. EVANS: Yes, sir.

437:45

MS. KAWASS: Yes, Your Honor.

537:46

JUDGE HANKINSON: Everybody got it?

637:47

MR. ZANGENEH: Yes, Judge.

737:48

MS. KAWASS: Yes, Your Honor.

837:49

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. For the record the question is: Can you be a principal to premeditation if you do not premeditate it yourself?

I've written a proposed answer. I will hear y'all's comments.

Dear Jurors, again, you are asking me to apply the facts to the law. On pages 2 and 3 I have defined first degree premeditated murder. On pages 5 and 6 I have defined principals. If you are confused by those definitions, please let me help clear up your confusion. However, I cannot answer hypothetical questions. I can only answer legal questions.

I will hear your comments. State?

938:43

MR. EVANS: Acceptable.

1038:52

MR. ZANGENEH: Your Honor, I would add in the independent -- I would also make a reference to the independent act because that's what it appears pragmatically that the jurors are asking. Can you be a principal to premeditation if you do not premeditate it yourself?

In my reading of it, that appears to be the exact position of an independent act, that this person in their hypothetical did an independent act.

1139:15

JUDGE HANKINSON: Do you want me to mention independent act?

1239:20

MR. ZANGENEH: Yes, Judge.

1339:21

JUDGE HANKINSON: I don't have a problem. I'm not sure that the question is that clear, that that's what they are asking.

1439:26

MR. ZANGENEH: I would ask the Court respectfully to add that.

1539:28

JUDGE HANKINSON: But that's one of the instructions. I don't have any problem referring to it also.

Magbanua?

1639:35

MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, Ms. Magbanua's position would be that the response should be that the jury needs to rely on the law that is presented to them in the instructions, and that is it.

1739:45

JUDGE HANKINSON: That's what I've done in a little bit of a long-winded way. I haven't told them anything else really. You know, I think we need to at least be acknowledging that we are trying to answer their questions. So, I mean, I agree with, in essence, what you are saying; but I don't think I have done anything else other than refer them back to the jury instructions and -- but I do think -- I think it is the second time.

I think it is important that I tell them that I cannot answer hypotheticals. I think that needs to be done because this is kind of just a veiled hypothetical. I think we need to get it across that I cannot answer hypotheticals or, I guess, we are going to continue to get them; so give me a minute.

Any specific objection to what I've said?

1840:43

MS. KAWASS: No, Your Honor.

1940:44

MR. EVANS: NO, Your Honor.

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. State, have a problem with me mentioning independent act also?

2140:53

MR. EVANS: We would request that it not be. They are not talking about independent act. They are talking about premeditation. It seemed to be pretty clear that they are having issues with that portion of --

2241:06

JUDGE HANKINSON: I mean, I think an argument can be made that their hypothetical would involve independent act. So I don't think it hurts to mention it. Again, all I am doing is referring them back to the jury instructions. Give me a minute.

(Pause. )

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. Let me read this. It says, Dear Jurors, again, you are asking me to apply the facts to the law. On pages 2 and 3 I have defined first degree premeditated murder. On pages 5 and 6 I have defined principals. On pages 6 and 7 I have defined independent act. If you are confused by those definitions, please let me help clear up your confusion. However, I cannot answer hypothetical questions. I can only answer legal questions.

Any additional objection to that explanation?

2546:22

MR. EVANS: NO, Sir.

2646:22

MR. ZANGENEH: No, Judge.

2746:23

MS. KAWASS: No, Your Honor.

2846:24

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. I will give that to the jury, and we will proceed. we will be in recess until we hear further.

(Court is in recess.)

Jury InstructionJury Instr.Jury Questions - Principal Liability and Split Verdicts

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. we had a question from the jury. Everybody has a copy of it?

MR. ZANGENEH: Yes, Judge.

JUDGE HANKINSON: Do you have a copy?

MR. EVANS: A copy of the jury --

MR. ZANGENEH: I left my copy -- yes, we are prepared.

MR. EVANS: we just had a knock on the door.

JUDGE HANKINSON: what is that?

MR. EVANS: Didn't they just knock on the door?

JUDGE HANKINSON: Let's wait a minute. Maybe we will have another one.

(Pause. )

BAILIFF: They are writing it down, Judge.

JUDGE HANKINSON: well, let's be talking about this one. So everybody has a copy?

MR. ZANGENEH: Yes, Judge.

MS. KAWASS: Yes, Judge.

MR. ZANGENEH: I had already seen it previously -- previous to that.

JUDGE HANKINSON: I will read it: According to the law, are there any exceptions/exemptions to an individual being a principal to a criminal act, and there is an arrow, reference instructions. Instructions page 5: Principals, paragraph 1, arrow, that the criminal act be done, i.e., principal to any act?

I'm not real sure how to respond to the question. I'll hear from y'all. what do you propose, State?

MR. EVANS: Your Honor, for the first part I don't believe there are any exceptions or exemptions -- if there are any exemptions or exceptions, if the elements are proved. And, two, as to the second part, now, because I read it sort of as a two-part question. It seems like they are getting caught up on this -- as they put, quote, commit a crime. And then the other part is that the crime -- excuse me, that the criminal act be done, and, i.e., principal to any act?

I think in this situation the -- we probably just need to change that language from commit a crime to commit first degree murder, second degree murder, or manslaughter. And then the second part, but that the criminal act be done. And that would be the first degree murder, second degree murder, third degree murder be done.

So I think there is a two-part answer to the question, and I think it should also not only be done under -- on page 5 where they are talking about the first way to commit a principal, but it also ought to be explained to them as well on the second part of -- on page 6 where it is the alternative version of showing how principal may be proved.

483:01:48

JUDGE HANKINSON: Mr. Zangeneh?

493:01:53

MR. ZANGENEH: I think it is pretty clear that their hang-up here based on this question and the other questions that follow is they are questioning whether or not a crime has to be the crime, okay. So I think the instruction has to be that they are the same thing. Committing a crime with the intent that the crime be done, I think that's fairly -- I wouldn't say obvious, but I think that that's the intention of what the question is.

I believe in my reading of this question and the questions that preceded it, that's what they wanted to do given the fact that this question is in line with the other questions. And if the Court recalls the first question was, if it is a robbery and then a homicide takes place, it falls in unison with this question. So I think the answer should be that principal applies to the charged crimes only. This is not a felony murder case, and that a crime and the crime have to be the same.

503:02:50
513:02:51

MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, I agree with Mr. Zangeneh.

523:02:56

JUDGE HANKINSON: Well, so what would you have me say?

533:03:07

MS. KAWASS: That it has to be to the charge -- the crime that is charged in the indictment in the -- for example, Judge, manslaughter is not a specific intent crime. You cannot be a principal to manslaughter. So then now it gets confusing. It is our position it should be the crime charged.

543:04:21

MR. ZANGENEH: Whenever the Court is ready -- I just want to add one thing whenever you are ready, Your Honor.

553:04:24

JUDGE HANKINSON: I am ready.

563:04:25

MR. ZANGENEH: With regards to what the government's requested that they include the second definition under the principal instructions, they didn't comment on that. I wouldn't bring that to their attention because they have it in front of us, and that's not one of the questions. I think we also need to say specifically, principal to any act. The Court needs to be very clear that the answer is, no. They are not the principal to any act. It has to be a principal to the charged crimes, the charged allegation -- the charged allegations.

573:04:57

MR. DECOSTE: The alleged crimes.

583:04:59

MR. ZANGENEH: The alleged crimes, yeah, all those things.

593:05:04

JUDGE HANKINSON: My problem is that it seems to me we are kind of guessing what they are asking us. And I don't really want to be guessing what they are asking us. I would propose telling them this: I have given you the full definition of principals. There are no exceptions/exemptions to an individual being a principal to a criminal act. I am not clear about the rest of your question. Please clarify your question for me.

I don't want to be trying to guess what they are talking about, and it seems to me we are kind of guessing what they are talking about. I mean, the first part is clear enough, but the rest of it is not clear. And I would rather have a clear question from them. I will let y'all be heard on that.

603:06:29

MR. EVANS: That would be acceptable to the State. we can give them another chance and see if they can articulate it any better if they wish to.

613:06:45

JUDGE HANKINSON: Mr. Zangeneh?

623:06:48

MR. ZANGENEH: Yes, Judge, I still hold the position that when they ask "commit a crime" and they underline the word "a" and then they ask “that the criminal act be done," I think what they are asking is if one crime was planned and then another crime happened, are you a principal? Because you have to have the conscious intent to commit that crime, but I will defer to the Court; but that's Mr. Garcia's position.

633:07:18
643:07:18

MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, based on the last sentence on their question, I believe they are wondering if the principal can be applied to any criminal act which is not the state of the law. You have to have knowledge that that crime is going to be committed, and that needs to be clear to them. Anything else would be a misstatement of the law because they are not charged with felony murder so --

653:08:02

JUDGE HANKINSON: well, I mean, wouldn't you agree we are kind of guessing what they are asking us?

663:08:12

MR. ZANGENEH: Let's clarify.

673:08:13

JUDGE HANKINSON: I don't see where it hurts anything to ask them to clarify their question.

683:08:17

MR. ZANGENEH: That's fine, Judge.

MS. KAWASS: That's fine, Judge.

703:09:45

JUDGE HANKINSON: If y'all don't have a problem, I will go ahead and give them this answer while we are working on the next question.

713:09:50

MR. ZANGENEH: Of course not, Judge. The next question --

723:09:52

JUDGE HANKINSON: we will go ahead and work on that one, but I am going to go ahead and deliver this to them.

733:10:08

MR. ZANGENEH: Thank you, Judge.

743:10:12

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. So the next inquiry from the jury: If we have a hung jury on one person, can we give a verdict on another? And, number two, if we have a hung jury on a count, can we give a verdict on the same individual with the other counts?

(Pause. )

763:11:56

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. So I think the answer to one is pretty clearly, yes. I don't know that it requires any elaboration. Does anybody believe that requires any elaboration?

773:12:09

MR. EVANS: NO, sir.

783:12:10

MR. ZANGENEH: No, Your Honor.

793:12:12

MS. KAWASS: No, Your Honor.

803:12:26

JUDGE HANKINSON: I have to read this second one again. Okay. So, I guess, what they are asking in number two is, there are three charges. If they've decided one or two but not the other, can they be hung on a single count? And, again, I think the answer is, yes, pretty clearly. Anybody feel like we need to elaborate further on that?

813:12:59

MR. EVANS: No, sir.

823:13:01

MR. ZANGENEH: No, Your Honor.

833:13:05

MR. DECOSTE: One brief second, Your Honor.

843:13:11

(Pause. )

853:13:18

MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, we are in agreement, but we would also ask if you could direct their attention to the instruction on page 13, multiple counts, multiple defendants, and verdict.

863:13:29

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. Okay. But I think the direct answer would be: One, yes. Two, yes. I will remind you of the instruction of multiple counts, multiple defendants on page 13. That would be agreeable to everyone?

873:13:51

MR. ZANGENEH: That's fine with me, Judge.

883:13:57
893:13:58

MS. KAWASS: Oh, I am sorry, Your Honor, yes.

903:14:08

JUDGE HANKINSON: Okay. well, let me write it, and then I will read it back to you.

(Pause. )

923:15:36

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. So it would be: Dear Jurors, number one, yes. Number two, yes.

And then I would continue: I refer you back to the instructions on page 13 as to multiple counts, multiple defendants for your consideration of these questions.

Anybody have a problem with that?

933:16:07

MR. ZANGENEH: Sorry. You go first.

943:16:09

MR. EVANS: No, Your Honor.

953:16:11

MR. ZANGENEH: No, Judge.

963:16:14

MS. KAWASS: Your Honor, I am having reservations as to the response to number two just because -- because I think it applies differently to Ms. Magbanua because the case that was presented against Ms. Magbanua -- and I would have to be assuming. TI don't know who they are talking about in question two. But the act that -- forming the principal is the conspiracy and the solicitation. So it almost seems like if it were to Ms. Magbanua, it is going to be inconsistent verdicts if it is not guilty or that they are hung on one and not the other if I am making sense.

JUDGE HANKINSON: I don't agree. That's the answer.

MS. KAWASS: Okay. I am just going to make that for the record, Judge.

JUDGE HANKINSON: I will overrule that objection.

MS. KAWASS: Okay. Thank you, Judge.

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. we will be in recess until we hear further from the jury.

ProceduralProc.Split-Verdict Procedure and Allen-Charge Ruling

(Court is in recess.)

1036:08:19

JUDGE HANKINSON: I got a note from the jury. I assume everybody has a copy of the note.

1046:08:25

MR. EVANS: Yes, Sir.

1056:08:26

MR. ZANGENEH: Yes, Judge.

1066:08:26

MS. KAWASS: Yes, Your Honor.

1076:08:27

JUDGE HANKINSON: For the record it says: The jury has reached a verdict on one defendant, all counts, and is hung on the second defendant on all counts.

I will hear from y'all how you wish to proceed. what is the State's position?

1086:08:44

MR. EVANS: We would be requesting an Allen charge on the second count. I guess there is some question as to whether or not we take the verdict on the first defendant, and then give them the Allen charge and send them back on the second defendant.

1096:08:58

JUDGE HANKINSON: Well, what do you suggest?

1106:09:00

MR. EVANS: we take the verdict on the first defendant, then give them the Allen charge, and send them back to consider on the second defendant.

1116:09:08
1126:09:09

MR. ZANGENEH: TI agree.

1136:09:11
1146:09:18

MS. KAWASS: Yes, Your Honor, I agree too because we would be requesting the Allen charge if they are hung on Ms. Magbanua.

1156:09:24

JUDGE HANKINSON: Well, we will find out I guess. Anyway, so everybody is in agreement. I will take the verdict on whichever defendant it is that they have decided. I will excuse that defendant and the attorneys. I mean, you can stay if you want, but there is no reason. And then I will give them the Allen charge as to the second defendant.

1166:09:58

MR. ZANGENEH: Your Honor, just for the record, with regards to if the defendant that's hung is Mr. Garcia, we would not be requesting the Allen charge just for the record.

1176:10:11

JUDGE HANKINSON: JI tell you what. I am going to change my mind about the one leaving because it depends if it is Mr. Garcia that has been convicted, we still need to talk about, you know, how we are going to proceed next. So anyway --

1186:10:24

MR. ZANGENEH: Yes, Judge, we are sticking around no matter what.

1196:10:24

JUDGE HANKINSON: And I think they are shackled at this point in time. If they will just -- there is a skirt there. If they will just remain seated when the jury comes in.

I am sorry. Let me respond to that. I am going to decide -- not now. I am not going to wait and see who is who as to what I am going to do, Mr. Zangeneh. So I don't think you can have it both ways. I am going to -- if there is a hung -- if they are at this point hung on one, whichever one it is, I am going to give an Allen charge. I am going to accept the verdict on the other one.

1206:11:06

MR. ZANGENEH: Yes, Judge.

VerdictVerdictSigfredo Garcia Verdict and Jury Polling

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. Let's have the jury in, please.

1226:13:02

(Jury enters the courtroom at 2:47 p.m.)

1236:13:05

JUDGE HANKINSON: Everybody be seated, please. Mr. Rusmisell, the notes have been from you, and I see you with the verdict form in your hand. Are you our foreperson?

1246:13:14

JUROR: Yes, Sir.

1256:13:15

JUDGE HANKINSON: It is my understanding that you have reached a verdict as to one of the defendants; is that correct?

1266:13:20

JUROR: Yes, sir.

1276:13:21

JUDGE HANKINSON: would you hand that verdict to the bailiff, please, sir.

1286:13:31

(Pause. )

1296:13:31

JUDGE HANKINSON: There should be no reaction to the verdict from anyone in the audience. If you can't abide by that, please step out.

State of Florida versus Sigfredo Garcia. we, the jury, find as follows as to Count 1: The defendant is guilty of first degree murder.

we, the jury, find as follows as to Count 2: The defendant is guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder.

we, the jury, find as follows as to Count 3: The defendant is not guilty.

So say we all this 11th day of October, 2019.

Mr. Rusmisell, did I accurately reflect the verdict of the jury?

1306:14:12

JUROR: Yes, you did, Your Honor.

1316:14:13

JUDGE HANKINSON: Do you wish to have the jury polled?

1326:14:15

MR. ZANGENEH: Yes, Judge.

1336:14:16

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. This is a standard procedure. I just need to confirm with each of you that what I've just announced is your individual verdict as well as the verdict of the jury as a whole. we will do it by number.

I am going to start with Number 1. Is this your verdict as well as the verdict of the jury as a whole as to Mr. Garcia?

1346:14:38

JUROR: Yes, Judge.

1356:14:39

JUDGE HANKINSON: Number 2 Juror?

1366:14:40

JUROR: Yes.

1376:14:40

JUDGE HANKINSON: Number 3 Juror?

1386:14:42

JUROR: Yes, sir.

1396:14:42

JUDGE HANKINSON: Number 4 Juror?

1406:14:44

JUROR: Yes.

1416:14:44

JUDGE HANKINSON: Number 5 Juror?

1426:14:45

JUROR: Yes, Judge.

1436:14:46

JUDGE HANKINSON: Number 6 Juror?

1446:14:47

JUROR: Yes.

1456:14:47

JUDGE HANKINSON: Number 7 Juror?

1466:14:49

JUROR: Yes, Sir.

1476:14:49

JUDGE HANKINSON: Number 8 Juror?

1486:14:51

JUROR: Yes.

1496:14:51

JUDGE HANKINSON: Number 9 Juror?

1506:14:52

JUROR: Yes.

1516:14:53

JUDGE HANKINSON: Number 10?

1526:14:53

JUROR: Yes.

1536:14:54

JUDGE HANKINSON: Number 11 Juror?

1546:14:55

JUROR: Yes, sir.

1556:14:56

JUDGE HANKINSON: Number 12 Juror?

1566:14:57

JUROR: Yes.

Jury InstructionJury Instr.Allen Charge - Katherine Magbanua Deliberations
1576:14:58

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. The jury has unanimously confirmed the verdict. It will be filed.

As to Ms. Magbanua that is left, I am going to give you an instruction on law. I would ask that you listen to my instruction as to that. I know that all of you have worked hard to try to find a verdict in this case. It, apparently, has been impossible for you so far as to Ms. Magbanua. Sometimes an early vote before discussion can make it hard to reach an agreement about the case later. The vote, not the discussion, might make it hard to see all sides of the case.

we are all aware that it is legally permissible for a jury to disagree. There are two things the jury can lawfully do, agree on a verdict or disagree on what the facts of the case may truly be. There is nothing to disagree about on the law. The law is as I told you.

If you have any disagreements about the law, I should clear them up for you now. That should be my problem, not yours. If you disagree over what you believe the evidence showed, then only you can resolve that conflict if it is to be resolved.

I only have one request of you. By law I cannot demand this of you. But I want you to go back into the jury room, then taking turns tell each of the other jurors about any weakness in your position. You should not interrupt each other or comment on each other's views until each of you has had a chance to talk.

After you have done that, if you simply cannot reach a verdict, then return to the courtroom. And I will declare this case mistried, and we will discharge you with my sincere appreciation for your services. You may now retire to consider -- continue with your deliberation.

1586:17:07

(Jury exits the courtroom at 2:53 p.m.)

ProceduralProc.Garcia Sentencing and Magbanua Deliberations
1596:17:16

JUDGE HANKINSON: Everybody be seated, please. From Magbanua, any objection to the instruction given?

1606:17:29

MR. DECOSTE: No, Your Honor.

1616:17:32

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. And from the State?

1626:17:40
1636:17:41

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. Garcia, you were going to get me some information on mitigating circumstances?

1646:17:50

MR. ZANGENEH: TI e-mailed it to Ms. Rissinger at like 11 o'clock this morning, Judge.

1656:17:55

JUDGE HANKINSON: She just hasn't let me know that. we will doublecheck on that.

1666:17:58

MR. ZANGENEH: JI can show the Court.

1676:18:00

JUDGE HANKINSON: I mean, I don't need to see it. I need the e-mails. Anyway, if we don't have it, we will let you know and work that out. There are probably some legal issues that we need to discuss before we start. So maybe what I am thinking is we maybe start at 10 o'clock on Monday with -- resolve some legal issues with the understanding we will start with the jury at 1 o'clock.

Does that work for y'all?

1686:18:34

MS. CAPPLEMAN: Yes, Sir.

1696:18:34

MR. ZANGENEH: That's fine, Judge.

1706:18:36

JUDGE HANKINSON: Mr. Evans?

1716:18:38

MR. EVANS: Yes, Your Honor. I will Tet the Court know, and I haven't had time to confirm the time; but I gave them some idea. Dr. Prichard, the State's mental health expert, will do the interview of -- and evaluation of Mr. Garcia around 1 o'clock at the jail. I know defense counsel has the right to be present.

1726:18:59

JUDGE HANKINSON: 1 o'clock when?

1736:19:00

MR. EVANS: Sunday.

1746:19:02

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. I guess y'all are here for the duration anyway. Any issues on any of that?

1756:19:08

MR. ZANGENEH: That's fine, Judge.

1766:19:10

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. So that's how we will proceed unless the juror tells us that 1 o'clock isn't going to work, but it seemed to me we had asked how long it would take. She said about half an hour. I think her appointment is at 11:00. So, anyway, that should work.

All right. Mr. Garcia is remanded to custody pending sentencing in this matter. we will start sentencing Monday morning at 10 o'clock. As to Magbanua, we will wait to hear further from the jury.

All right. So Mr. Garcia can be excused. There is no reason to have him here.

ProceduralProc.Magbanua Mistrial Scheduling and Representation

(Court is in recess.)

JUDGE HANKINSON: I believe both sides received a copy of the note from the jury?

MS. CAPPLEMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. DECOSTE: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. And it will be my intention to declare a mistrial at this point in time as to Ms. Magbanua based on the jury's note.

Does anybody have a different view?

MR. DECOSTE: No, Your Honor.

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. I am going to bring them in and accept that -- confirm with the foreperson their inability, and then give them instructions to come back Monday.

Have y'all discussed what you want to set Ms. Magbanua for next?

MS. CAPPLEMAN: NO, sir, we have not.

JUDGE HANKINSON: Case management in a couple of weeks?

MS. CAPPLEMAN: Yes, sir, that's fine.

JUDGE HANKINSON: Kathy, can you give us a date a couple of weeks out?

MR. DECOSTE: Your Honor, we can't answer that question at this time. Of course, we are in a different position than the prosecution. We were retained to try this one case. There is that matter.

I also, myself, have several federal trials that are going to be going in the next couple of months which I am not trying to make up excuses now as to a timeframe. It is just being up here for the past month, there are things that need to be tended to. I believe they need to be tended to first.

1910:02

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. well, we are going to seta case management in a few weeks. Y'all can discuss what your status is, but it needs to have at least a holding date so we don't lose track of it.

1920:15

MR. DECOSTE: Understood.

1930:15

JUDGE HANKINSON: Give us one out.

1940:17

COURT CLERK: October 22nd at 10:30.

1950:18

JUDGE HANKINSON: why don't you give us the next one.

1960:20

COURT CLERK: Judge, you will be in the other one on 11-4 and 11-5.

1970:24

JUDGE HANKINSON: What's that?

COURT CLERK: You will be in Segura 11-4 and 11-5. Do you want to go that far?

1990:29

JUDGE HANKINSON: why don't we go the next one after that.

2000:32

COURT CLERK: November the --

2010:35

JUDGE HANKINSON: well, I guess there is a --

2020:39

COURT CLERK: -- nineteenth?

2030:40

JUDGE HANKINSON: Let's do October 24th. Is that a Tuesday?

2040:45

COURT CLERK: October 22nd, yes, sir, it is.

2050:53

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. we will set a case management October 22nd at 10:30. Y'all just need to advise us what your status is by then and discuss getting it reset at that point in time. All right.

2061:06

MR. DECOSTE: Your Honor wants to know our status on the case by then?

2081:09

MR. DECOSTE: Understood.

2091:09

JUDGE HANKINSON: If you are going to continue to represent Ms. Magbanua or not.

2101:13

MR. DECOSTE: All right. I am not trying to give an indication that we are not. Just, I know Your Honor knows there are things that need to be addressed before we can announce that.

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. Let's have the jury, please.

VerdictVerdictKatherine Magbanua Mistrial Declaration
2121:58

(Jury enters the courtroom at 3:29 p.m.)

2132:00

JUDGE HANKINSON: Everybody be seated, please. All right. Mr. Rusmisell, I take from your note that as to Ms. Magbanua the jury is unable to come to a unanimous decision on any of the three charges; is that correct?

2142:16

JUROR: That's correct, Your Honor.

ProceduralProc.Garcia Sentencing Jury Logistics
2152:17

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. So as to Ms. Magbanua, I will declare this case mistried. As we have discussed, I will set a case management October 22nd at 10:30, see where we go for that.

I know y'all worked hard. Sometimes it just doesn't work out, and that's nothing to be concerned about as long as everybody in good faith was trying to follow the law as I explained it. That's just part of the process. It happens.

Normally, I would tell you, you're done; but, unfortunately, you're not done. we still need to have another proceeding as to Mr. Garcia.

Ms. Evans, it is my understanding you have a doctor's appointment at 11 o'clock Monday. So what we've discussed with the parties is starting at 1 o'clock on Monday. Will that allow you to make your appointment?

2163:17

JUROR: Yes, sir.

2173:18

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. So we are going to reconvene Monday at 1 o'clock. Let's get in here a few minutes before that if you would please so we can get started right at 1 o'clock.

Just to give you a little idea of where we stand, from talking to the attorneys they are anticipating about a half day of testimony. So we will probably finish the testimony on Monday afternoon and make argument and instructions to you on Tuesday morning. So that's kind of where we -- you know, things can change; but that's everybody's best understanding at this point in time.

So you still need to abide by the Court rules and not discuss the case with anyone. It is possible someone would inquire of you. They may think since Mr. Garcia is decided on the first part that they can ask you about that. Still you can't discuss that. And don't discuss your situation as to Ms. Magbanua even though y'all are done with consideration of that because the cases are too closely related for you to separate those two things out. Don't watch any media accounts. Don't read the paper.

Anybody have any questions about what is expected of you? we will see you Monday at 1 o'clock. we will let you step out with the bailiff.

(Jury exits the courtroom.)

JUDGE HANKINSON: Anything else from anybody?

JUDGE HANKINSON: Anything else?

MR. DECOSTE: No, Your Honor.

JUDGE HANKINSON: All right. we will be in recess.

(Court is in recess at 3:32 p.m.)